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Abstract This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in
Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits
within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate
for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based
on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period.
We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now
covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with
higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reduc-
tions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a
typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the
factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of
bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of
workers’ representation in collective bargaining.
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Introduction
Reforms in collective bargaining practices and their associated labor market outcomes
hold a prominent position in the industrial and labor relations literature and, more often
than not, provoke heated public debate. The present study focuses on such a reform in
the Greek labor market, which was introduced in November 2011 (Law 4024/2011)
and concerns the decentralization of collective bargaining in general and firm-level
contracting in particular. According to the reform, workers in those firms that do not
meet the requirements for the establishment of a typical trade union (TU, henceforth) at
the workplace,1 may now form a Workers’ Association (WA, henceforth) and partic-
ipate in wage negotiations. Furthermore, contractual base wages can be lower than
those reached after negotiations at higher levels, i.e., sectoral/ occupational/ regional,
but not lower than the national minimum wage (NMW hereafter). Thus, in the post-
reform period, the possibility of base-wage adjustments is stronger while the field for
firm-level contracting has been considerably expanded. We note that this reform was
part of the Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Greek Government and the
so called BTroika^ (European Commission, European Central Bank, International
Monetary Fund) in May 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis intensified. Its stated
objective was to confront the longstanding wage rigidities in the Greek economy and
alleviate the extensive gaps between labor costs and firm-specific productivity (Dickens
et al. 2007; OECD 2011; Bentolila et al. 2012).
Theoretical aspects of nominal wage rigidity are usually analyzed within a general
equilibrium framework of the aggregate economy (Blinder 1977; Fischer 1977; Taylor
1980; Calvo 1983; Christiano et al. 2005). Ordinarily, the response of nominal wages to
external sources of variation (e.g. reforms) depends on factors related to elements of the
wage setting mechanism of collective bargaining, such as type, timing and duration of
agreements. In this context, the flexibility of labor contracts is determined by the type of
agreement and the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post wage adjustments to the
changing economic environment (Gray 1978; Canzoneri 1980). It is also established that
contractual agreements depend on the trade union decision-making processes (Ehrenberg
et al. 1983). The role of labor market institutions is of paramount importance since
nominal wage changes rarely bear a negative sign (Card and Hyslop 1997; Dickens
et al. 2007). In addition, institutions are of primary concern in tight economic conditions.
For instance, when the issue of base wage cuts is on the table of wage negotiations, the
phenomenon of concession bargaining may arise (Cappelli 1985; Holden 1994). That is,
in recessionary periods, the bargaining position of unions weakens while employers’
leverage gets stronger (e.g. plant closing, lock-out or agreement termination), thus leading
to an imbalance that may cause nominal base wage squeezes.
The objectives of this study are the following: First, to document in brief the transfor-
mation of the collective bargaining process in Greece. Second, to quantify the resulted
extensive (direction of adjustment) and intensive (magnitude of adjustment) margins of
nominal base-wage adjustments. Third, to investigate the links between base-wage
outcomes and type of workers’ representation (WA vs TU) and provide explanations for
possible differentiated outcomes. In order to do so, we have developed a unique dataset
from the universe of the official centralized and decentralized collective agreements
1 At least 20 employees under Law 1264/1982.
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(contracts) reached in the period January 2010- December 2013. The extracted data refer
to settlements and provisions regarding base wage and non-wage outcomes. More
specifically, we have extracted information on (a) the level of collective bargaining, i.e.
sectoral, occupational, regional and firm, (b) the magnitude of the base-wage adjustment
of the lowest paid worker, (c) the dates the agreement was reached and became effective
as well as its duration, (d) the type of workers’ representation (TU vs WA) and (e) the
industry affiliation and the geographical coverage. The importance of contract data and
their superiority vis-a-vis survey firm-level data in analysing downward wage rigidities is
highlighted by Christofides and Stengos (2003). Survey-based studies investigating the
determinants of wage adjustment include Babecký et al. (2010), Druant et al. (2012) and
Le Le Bihan et al. (2012), while contract-based studies contain the works of Sparks and
Wilton (1971), Murphy (1992; 2000), Christofides and Laporte (2002), Christofides and
Stengos (2003), Christofides and Li (2005) and Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2013). In both cases,
firm-specific variables (e.g. firm size, profitability etc.) as well as aggregate conditions
(e.g. real and expected inflation, unemployment and business cycle) have been found to
exert a significant impact on the incidence and magnitude of wage adjustments.
We utilize discrete choice models to estimate the determinants of the extensive
margin of base-wage adjustments and typical OLS for the estimation of the intensive
margin. In the latter case we also estimate limited dependent variable models (Tobit)
given the mass of zeros in the distribution of base-wage changes (Avouyi-Dovi et al.
2013). Overall, our results indicate that the incidence of firm-level contracting in-
creased dramatically after the reform, and base-wage reductions are higher in firms in
which workers are represented by workers’ associations as compared to firms where
typical trade unions operate. Moreover, the driving factors of nominal base wage
adjustments also seem to depend on the type of workers’ representation within the firm.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the institutional setting
regarding the system of collective bargaining in Greece in the pre- and post-reform
periods. Section 3 presents analytically the data sources and provide evidence on the
number of contracts, the type of workers’ representation in wage negotiations, the
coverage rates, the magnitude of base-wage changes and statistics on selected firms
specific attributes and relevant macroeconomic variables. Section 4 presents the em-
pirical strategy and Section 5 the estimation results regarding both, the extensive and
intensive margins of nominal base-wage adjustments. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Setting
Decentralized Bargaining Before the Reform
Decentralizedcollectivebargaining inGreecewasestablished in1982(Law1246/1982)but
became effective only after 1990 under the provisions of Law 1876/1990 (Daouli et al.
2013). Complete trade union freedom regarding the creation, internal operation and action
was granted by Law 1246/1982. Law 1876/1990 allowed for firm-level collective negoti-
ations in the sense that a bargaining process at the firm level could be initiated either by a
firm-level TU with at least 20 members or by an employer with at least 50 employees.
Furthermore, firm-level negotiations could be conducted between the employer and an
upper-level sectoralTU in the absenceof a firm-level one. If adispute arises, thenegotiating
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parties could resort to mediation and arbitration procedures. Previous evidence has shown
that nearly one third of negotiations had been subjected tomediation and about half of them
to arbitration procedures (Koukiadis 2009).
Regarding broader levels of bargaining, negotiations at the national level were
taking place periodically, usually every 2 years, between the central confederation of
employers (Hellenic Federation of Enterprises) and employees (General Confederation
of Greek Workers) with their outcomes being automatically extended to cover every
wage earner in Greece. These agreements were then followed by more decentralized
bargaining at the sectoral and occupational levels, which always produced improved
outcomes for the labor side. This multi-level bargaining process established a series of
minimum wage floors, on top of the national one, which were also extended to cover
every corresponding worker group.2 Moreover, according to the provisions of Law
1876/1990, collective negotiations could take place at the firm level also leading to
more favourable outcomes for the labor side. Hence, broader and firm-level collective
agreements operated in a cumulative way leading to multiple wage drifts for those
workers covered by more than one agreement. 3 It is evident that the established
hierarchy among the various bargaining levels allowed only for upward wage flexibility
(the Bfavourability principle^) regardless of the prevailing macro, local or firm-level
conditions. Furthermore, given the positive skewness of the firm-size distribution in the
Greek economy, the implementation of firm-level bargaining was very limited.4
The 2011 Reform (Law 4024/2011)
The Greek government attempted to address the need for a more decentralized
bargaining regime in early 2010 via Law 3899/2010. According to that Law, firms
facing severe financial constraints were allowed to establish wages below the thresh-
olds set by sectoral or occupational agreements. That Law also allowed firms with less
than 50 employees to sign firm-level contracts as long as workers were represented by a
TU. However, this possibility was only figurative since a minimum of twenty workers
is required for a TU to be established, therefore the majority of Greek firms was once
again automatically excluded. Moreover, it involved considerable administrative costs
since the employer side had to submit both the agreement and the rationale behind it to
the Council of Social Control of the Labor Inspectorate, and then wait for the council to
opine back. As a result, and despite the fact that the favourability principle was lifted in
favour of more decentralized bargaining, only a handful of firm-level collective
agreements were signed under the provisions of Law 3899/2010. Eventually, it was
considered as an inadequate tool for promoting wage adjustments and was replaced by
Law 4024/2011 in late 2011. According to the Greek Ministry of Labour, Social
Security and Welfare (Hellenic Labour Inspectorate, Annual Report) the number of
2 In the case where an agreement at a broader level (sectoral or occupational) was signed by a firm (or, an
association of firms) which employed 51 percent or more of the total workforce in the sector or occupation in
question, the agreement was extended automatically to cover all the workers in that sector or occupation
(Voskeritsian and Kornelakis, 2011).
3 Daouli et al. (2013) provide a detailed analysis of the impact of firm-level bargaining on individual wages in
Greece during the pre-reform period.
4 In the period 2002–2014, no more than 1% of the total number of firms in Greece employed more than 50
employees (Hellenic Statistical Authority and SME Performance Review).
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firm-level contracts signed during 2011 was 154 i.e., 95 contracts were signed under
Law 1876/1980 and 11 under Law 3899/2010 (period 1/1/2011-27/10/2011) and 48
under Law 4024/2011 (period 27/10/2011-31/12/2011). According to the latter, not
only TU but also WA (operating in firms with 5 or more employees and representing at
least 60 % of the company’s workforce) are given the opportunity to engage in wage
negotiations at the firm level. Once an agreement is reached, it prevails over those set at
broader levels of collective bargaining, i.e. sectoral or occupational, even if it contains
worse terms and conditions for the labor side. Law 4024/2011 has drastically limited
the involvement of sectoral TU in decentralized negotiations, i.e. firm-level wage
bargaining. Therefore, the process of wage setting is no longer impervious to produc-
tivity changes, firm’s financial situation and local labor market conditions. Neverthe-
less, the NMWagreement still constitutes the base wage floor for every wage earner in
the Greek economy.5 As expected, a dramatic increase in the number of firm-level
contracts was observed immediately after the introduction of Law 4024/2011 (Novem-
ber 2011). According to Ioannou and Papadimitriou (2013) the average number of firm-
level contracts per year stood at 160 in the period 1990-2011, it spiked to 976 in 2012
and according to the Greek Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare declined to
409 in 2013 (Fig. 1). Furthermore, the number of sectoral/occupational/regional agree-
ments fell considerably during that period. Hence, exploring the wage outcomes of
collective bargaining under the new Law is crucial in understanding its impact.
Data and Descriptive Evidence
Data Sources
In order to examine the variation of nominal base-wage outcomes in Greece during the
period 2010–2013 we utilize contractual data pertaining to the universe of the official
contracts of decentralized firm-level collective agreements. These agreements are publicly
available on the website of the Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and cover
the period between January 2010 and December 2013.6 The database contains detailed
information for 1607 contracts (we excluded those 11 contracts signed during 2011 under
Law 3899/2010) on the (a) type of representation, (b) timing and duration of the contract,
(c) wage settlements and (e) place of agreement, business name and tax identification
number of the firm. In order to provide evidence on the representativeness of the
constructed dataset and the coverage rate (in terms of number of firms and employees)
we employed the company name and the tax identification number to match each firm
engaged in decentralized negotiations to additional information, i.e. number of em-
ployees, industry affiliation, ownership and the after-tax net profit margin.7 In addition,
we were able to construct variables indicating whether the entire workforce of the firm is
covered by the contract, clauses regarding industrial peace, trade union dues, time-off for
5 For a compact review of the institutional changes in the Greek labor market before and during the fiscal
crisis, see Voskeritsian and Kornelakis (2011; 2014).
6 http://www.ypakp.gr/index.php?ID=79h7QJQee4NLStoF (in Greek).
7 The matching has been made possible given the access granted from Infobank Hellastat S.A. (IBHS) to its
iMentor online search engine. IBHS is a major Greek business information provider and iMentor covers all
Greece-based firms, industries and professionals (http://www.hellastat.eu/index.php/en/on-line/imentor).
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trade union duties and provisions regarding productivity bonuses.8 Given the escalating
incidence of decentralized agreements in the post-reform period, the constructed database
enables us to investigate the structure of firm-level collective bargaining in the post-
reform period. For comparison purposes, we collected information on centralized collec-
tive bargaining agreements (sectoral, occupational and regional) for the same period
(January 2010-December 2013) and more specifically on the timing and duration of the
contract and the wage settlements. This information allows us to compare the nominal
base-wage adjustments (extensive and intensive margins) between centralized and
decentralized bargaining in the pre and post-reform periods.
Number of Contracts and Type of Representation
As Fig. 1 depicts, the number of firm-level contracts increased considerably since 2010
and at the same time the number of broader-level agreements decreased. The construct-
ed database contains firm-level contracts representing 1607 bargaining pairs. In the pre-
reform period, workers could be represented only by a typical TU in firm-level
negotiations. In the post-reform period workers could be represented by either a TU
or a WA operating within the firm. From the total number of contracts signed in the
examined period 58.2 % (936 out of 1607) correspond to agreements signed by a WA
and the remaining 41.8 % (671 out of 1607) correspond to other forms of typical trade
union (TU) representation at the firm level (trade union/ federal/ occupational/ local).9
8 Our database does not contain additional components that may capture other margins of potential labour cost
adjustments such as employment, hours of work, early retirement, etc.
9 We note that TU refers to either the firm-level trade union or a higher level trade union which conducts wage
negotiations at the firm-level on behalf of the firm’s employees.
Fig. 1 Evolution of broader and firm-level contracts, Greece (1990–2013)
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Our dataset shows that the average firm size when a WA (TU) is conducting the
negotiations is 30 (521) employees. In addition, three distinct dates are clearly specified
in each contract, i.e. date of signature, effective and expiration dates. From the last two
we were able to calculate the duration of each contract. The most prevalent duration
categories in the examined period are 4 quarters (33.72 %) and 12 quarters (18.25 %).
In the pre-reform period, the duration of the majority of contracts was 4 quarters
(76.67 %) while the contracts signed in 2012 have a longer duration.
Figure 2 presents the number of agreements signed by TU and WA as well as the
number of active contracts (currently effective contracts) in each quarter during the
period 2010–2013. It is clear that signed and active contracts by WA dominate in the
post-reform period. The figure also shows that in the pre-reform period firm-level
contracts were exclusively signed by TU. We also see that the rate of growth in the
number of firm-level contracts has increased considerably in the post-reform period.
The leap in this growth rate is exclusively due to the increase in the number of contracts
signed by WA. Lastly, we note that the number of active contracts remains at high
levels despite the drop in the number of signed contracts after 2012q3, indicating the
longer duration of firm-level contracts signed shortly after the introduction of the
reform.
Coverage Rates
Firm-level contracting in Greece pertains to a small share of firms and employees.
According to the weighted data of the Structure of Earning Survey, in 2002 (2006) only
9.1 % (6.1 %) of the total number of employees in workplaces with 10–49 employees
are covered by firm-level contracts. In addition, these firm-level contracts correspond to
Fig. 2 Evolution of active and signed firm-level contracts by type of workers’ representation, Greece (2010–
2013)
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8.5 % (6.6 %) of the total number of firms with 10–49 employees. The corresponding
coverage rates for workplaces with 50 or more employees are 14 % (9.1 %) and 8.7 %
(8.1 %), respectively. Furthermore, the data on centralized bargaining (2002 and 2006)
show around 90 % of the workforce in workplaces with 10 or more employees are
covered by various forms of collective agreements at the broader level (national/
sectoral/occupational/regional). The latest available Structure of Earnings Survey indi-
cates that the share of centralized bargaining has remained unchanged in 2010. 10
Coverage data for the post-reform period are not directly available and, even if they
were, they are not comparable with the pre-reform period. This is because under the
provisions of the new legislation, firms with 5 or more employees are now eligible to
sign firm-level contracts.
The constructed dataset allows us to identify the number of employees covered by
every firm-level contract. Figure 3 displays the evolution of the employment coverage
of active contracts (number of employees) and for firms with 5–49 and with 50 or more
employees (2010q1 = 100). We observe that the number of workers covered by firm-
level contracts in workplaces with 5–49 employees increased drastically in the post-
reform period. In addition, it increased two and a half-times faster than the growth rate
of covered workers in workplaces with 50 or more employees.
To calculate the employment coverage rate we need information on the total number
of workers in each firm-size class. This is of particular importance since, in the case of
Greece, the bulk of the workforce is employed in firms with less than 10 employees and
in particular in the size class of 1–4 employees. Specifically, according to the Greek
10 Published data from Eurostat show that 80 % of the workforce in the Greek 2010 Structure of Earning
Survey is covered by national and/or sectoral collective bargaining agreements without any additional
information on firm level contracting.
Fig. 3 Evolution of the cumulative number of employees covered by active firm-level contracts, Greece
(2010–2013)
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section of the 2010 European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions dataset,
51.53 % of the total number of wage earners in workplaces with 1–10 employees work
in micro firms (1–4 employees). Combining this information with the weighted
quarterly employment data -for different firm sizes- from the Greek Labour Force
Survey (2010–2013), we were able to calculate the coverage rate for employees in
workplaces with 5–49 and with 50 or more employees (non-government sector workers
in NACE Rev.1, codes 10–93). Figure 4 presents the obtained cumulative employment
coverage rate of firm-level contracts. As expected, firm-level contracts in firms with 50
or more employees represent a disproportionally higher share of the total employment
in this specific class size compared to firms with 5–49 employees. We also observe that
the coverage rate increased substantially in the first two quarters of 2012 (i.e., shortly
after the introduction of the reform). Thus, in the post-reform period, the number of
firm-level contracts increased across the board and the same holds for the coverage rate.
However, the increase in the coverage rate concerns primarily firms with 50 or more
employees. In fact, half of the workforce in firms with 50 or more employees are
covered by firm level agreements in the post reform period. These developments may
have important implications for the contractual nominal base-wage changes, which we
now turn to explore.
Nominal Base-Wage Changes
Official data for the magnitude of base-wage changes in 2012 are provided by the
Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and the Greek Organisation for
Mediation and Arbitration. According to these data, in broader-level agreements with
wage provisions (21 out of 29 agreements), almost 33 % stipulated zero changes in
contractual base wages, 19 % were associated with wage reductions in the range of 5–
Fig. 4 Cumulative employment coverage rate in workplaces with 5–49 employees and 50 or more em-
ployees, Greece (2010–2013)
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9 %, 14 % with reductions between 10 –14 % and 33 % with reductions of more than
15 %. In the case of firm-level contracting, from the total number of 976 agreements,
wage settlements are explicitly reported in 826 agreements. About 57.6 % of these
agreements set base wages at the NMW level. The remaining population of agreements
(350 out of 826), pertained to base-wage reductions (53 %), 45 % let base wages
unchanged and only 2 % led to base wage increases. Half of the contracts with base-
wage reductions were associated with a decline of more than 20 % (Ioannou and
Papadimitriou 2013).
Our dataset provides a more insightful picture of base-wage changes in the examined
period. We employ two measures of nominal base-wage adjustments: the extensive and
intensive margins. Regarding the extensive margin, we register each contract in one out
of three possible wage outcomes, i.e., Bupward adjustment^ for positive changes,
Bwage stickiness^ for zero wage change and Bdownward adjustment^ for negative
changes.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of contractual base-wage changes by type of
collective bargaining (broader level vs firm level) and workers’ representation (TU vs
WA) for the examined period as well as for the pre- (January 2010-October 2011) and
post-reform (November 2011-December 2013) periods. Regarding the extensive mar-
gin, we observe that in the pre-reform period only 3.9 % of firm-level contracts and
7.7 % of broader-level contracts stipulated base-wage reductions. The corresponding
figures for the post-reform period are 74.9 and 52.8 %, respectively. Similarly, wage
stickiness pertaining to firm-level contracts does not appear to be different between the
two periods (around 23.0 %). In contrast, wage stickiness in broader-level contracts has
doubled in the post-reform period (from 19.8 to 37.7 %). Regarding the intensive
margin, we observe that in the pre-reform period the mean base-wage changes for
broader- and firm-level contracts are positive and equal to 1.1 and 2.8 %, respectively.
In the post-reform period, the mean base-wage changes are negative and stand at 7.1 %
for broader-level contracts and 9.2 % for firm-level ones. Both the extensive and
intensive margins of base-wage adjustments indicate that in the post-reform period
(a) agreements led to base-wage reductions in both types of collective bargaining, (b)
broader-level contracts became stickier and (c) firm-level contracts resulted in greater
base-wage reductions.
With regard to firm-level contracting, workers could be represented by either a TU
or a WA in the post-reform period. Concerning the extensive margin, nominal down-
ward base-wage adjustments are more prominent in the case of WA (88.6 vs 41.4 %). In
contrast, wage stickiness pertains mainly to contracts signed by TU (55.6 vs 10.3 %). In
reference to the intensive margin, the average base-wage change is much greater in the
case of WA representation (-14.0 vs -4.6 %). Thus, downward nominal base-wage
adjustments in firm-level contracting are primarily driven by the bargaining outcomes
of WA. This indicates that the introduction of WA by Law 4024/2011 as a new form of
workers’ representation is related to greater base-wage reductions than the traditional
form of workers’ representation (TU). It is interesting to note that the constructed
dataset is considered to be a reliable source of information regarding the direction of
base-wage changes since the majority of firm-level contracts (more than 93 %) report in
an explicit way the adjustments for the entire period and by type of collective
bargaining agreements. However, in the case of the intensive margin, our results may
contain a reporting bias since only 36.9 % of firm-level contracts signed by WA, for
J Labor Res (2016) 37:460–483 469
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which the extensive margin is known, contain the precise magnitude of the base-wage
change (336 out of 909).
In order to obtain a vivid picture of the evolution of contractual base-wage adjust-
ments in the examined period we should take into account the binding nature and the
effective duration of the contract. Given that the effective period of a specified contract
is determined by its effective date and duration. Figure 5 presents the evolution of
contractual nominal base-wage changes for all active contracts by type of collective
bargaining (sectoral and firm level) and by firm size. We observe that in the pre-reform
period, on average, nominal base-wage changes were positive and of the same magni-
tude regardless of the type of agreement and firm size. This regularity was interrupted
in the first quarter of 2012 when the reform was implemented and a reduction in the
NMWwas imposed by the government. The evolution of the latter for the period 2000–
2013 is presented at Fig. 6. In February 2012, the government reduced arbitrarily the
NMW by 22% (from 751 to 586 euros per month). Returning to Fig. 5, we observe that
in the post-reform period the size of the downward adjustment in nominal base wages
varies with the size of the firm and the type of collective bargaining. Contracts signed at
the firm level are associated with higher base-wage reductions as compared to the
sectoral level ones. Furthermore, firm-level contracts in workplaces with 50 or more
employees exhibit lower wage reductions than those in smaller firms (5–49 em-
ployees). Thus, the magnitude of the base-wage downward adjustments is no longer
uniform and more specifically, it is greater for firm-level contracts in small-sized firms.
We also observe that the wage responsiveness of sectoral agreements, which are now
less frequent, appears to take place with a delay and it is smaller in comparison to firm-
level ones.
Fig. 5 Nominal base-wage changes in active collective bargaining agreements by type of representation and
firm-size, Greece (2010–2013)
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Firm-Specific Attributes and Macroeconomic Conditions
The variation in bargained base-wage outcomes reflects differences either in these
outcomes between the pre- and post-reform period and/or in firm-specific attributes.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables included in our dataset. For
comparison purposes, we report summary statistics for the pre- and post-reform periods
and by type of workers’ representation (WAvs TU). With regard to firm-level contracts
signed by TU, we observe that in the post-reform period the frequency of contracts with
provisions for trade union dues and the duration of the contracts have increased and
now concern primarily larger firms. Regarding the comparison between TU and WA in
the post-reform period, we observe that a higher percentage of agreements signed by
WA include an industrial peace clause and pertain to smaller firms. Lastly, contracts
signed by WA pertain to private firms, located in Northern Greece, with smaller
average profitability and concentrated in BRetail trade^ and BOther activities^.
In addition, the share of contracts with provisions for productivity bonuses is higher
in the case of TU compared to the share of those contracts signed by WA (0.092 vs
0.026). This indicates that in contracts signed by TU there is a higher probability of
identifying sources of wage flexibility (e.g. bonuses) that may operate independently of
the contractual base wages. We should note however that while this share was stable in
the period 2010-2012 (around 0.122) it declined to 0.075 in 2013. In contrast, in the
case of contracts signed by WA this share fluctuated between 0.026-0.036 for the post
reform period. In other words, in the case of TU, the downward adjustment process is
not only evident in the case of base wage outcomes but also in the part of flexible wage
components. This may indicate that firms with a substantial portion of flexible wages
are more able to adjust their marginal labour costs by reducing the flexible part of
contractual wages rather than the base wage itself.
Fig. 6 Nominal monthly national minimum wage in current euros, Greece (2000–2013)
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An additional source of variation that may affect nominal base-wage adjustments, is
the macroeconomic environment in which collective bargaining takes place. In this
context it is interesting to examine whether base-wage outcomes observed in our
Table 2 Frequencies of firm-level contracting by period, type of worker representation and firm-level
characteristics
Pre-reform period Post-reform period
TU TU WA
Contract clauses
Industrial peace .048 .047 .130
Trade union dues .022 .277 .004
Time-off union duties .346 .310 .001
Provisions for productivity bonuses .095 .092 .026
Duration of labor contract
1–4 quarters .712 .357 .370
5–8 quarters .125 .270 .167
9 or more quarters .163 .373 .463
Firm size
5–19 employees .369 .245 .418
20–49 employees .077 .077 .448
50–149 employees .147 .210 .108
150 or more employees .407 .467 .026
Firm ownership
State/Municipal/Cooperative/Social .074 .163 .039
Private .926 .837 .961
Net profit margin (after tax)
0–25 percentile .144 .160 .145
25–75 percentile .232 .242 .330
75–100 percentile .151 .200 .155
Missing: not reported .473 .397 .370
Industry
Manufacturing .616 .502 .269
Retail trade .040 .080 .286
Services .317 .375 .155
Other (Agriculture/Fishing, Construction, Leisure) .027 .043 .290
Region
Northern Greece .144 .250 .447
Central Greece .125 .130 .193
Attica .698 .563 .284
Aegean and Crete .033 .057 .076
Number of contracts 271 400 936
Source: Greek Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Welfare and database created by the authors using the
iMentor online search engine (authors’ calculations)
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dataset follow the general market wage developments in the Greek economy. An
appealing feature of our dataset is that it allows such comparisons. The evidence
provided so far indicates that contractual base wages in firm-level agreements signed
after the reform lead more often to reductions. Using data on net monthly nominal
wages (non-government sector) from the Labour Force Survey we present at Fig. 7 the
growth rates of both wage series.11 We observe that both share a rather common trend
(correlation coefficient of 50 %) indicating that contractual base wages follow the
general downward path of the Greek economy. Given this and using the date and place
of agreement for each firm-level contract we are able to take into account several
macroeconomic variables and events which could drive the observed base-wage
changes (i.e., monthly national unemployment, local annual unemployment at the
NUTS-3 level, monthly expected Eurozone inflation with 2010 as the base year and
a dummy indicator for the post-February 2012 period in which the reduced NMW
became effective).
Empirical Strategy
In this section we present the empirical strategy for modelling nominal base-wage
adjustments using the provisions on contractual base-wage outcomes explicitly deter-
mined within each firm-level contract. In particular, the unit of analysis is the contract (i.e.
the firm-level agreement) and concerns a specific firm-union bargaining pair. For
11 Wage data at the firm-level are not available since only firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange are
obliged to follow the International Accounting Standards (IAS).
Fig. 7 Evolution of nominal contractual base-wage changes (firm-level contracts) and net nominal monthly
market wage (LFS), Greece (2000–2013)
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analytical purposes, we aim to investigate the determinants of the extensive and the
intensive margins of nominal base-wage adjustments. With regard to the reform in
question, the downward nominal base-wage adjustments could be the result of the reform
and/or reflect the deteriorating economic conditions. However, the ability of firms and
workers to sign a firm-level contract by establishing a WA at the workplace is a
particularity in our analytical setting since it constitutes a new type of workers’ represen-
tation in collective bargaining, which could be associated with the post-reform period
base-wage adjustments. That is, only a subset of the contracts signed in the post reform
period are signed by a WA. Thus, we need to disentangle the effect of the reform from
other time variant effects which are common to all contracts.12 For example, in the pre-
and post-reform periods, heterogeneity in downward nominal base-wage adjustments
between different bargaining levels and different types of workers’ representation during
firm-level collective negotiations (TU vsWA) might be involved. Therefore, we consider
five sources of variation. In particular, our set of independent variables capture (a) the
post-reform period effect that differentiates the wage bargaining outcomes from those
reached in the pre-reform period, (b) the upgraded role ofWA in decentralized bargaining,
(c) the structure of workers’ representation during wage negotiations and the duration of
contracts, (d) several firm-specific attributes (demographic and financial) and (e) the
macroeconomic environment in which decentralized bargaining takes place.
In this context, we estimate a simple empirical model of the following form:
y jt ¼ aþ β1Pt þ β2WAjt þ β3C jt þ β4F jt þ β5Mt þ e jt ð1Þ
where, yjt is the base-wage outcome for a specific contract j signed at time t, Pt is a
dummy indicator for the post-reform period (November 2011-December 2013),WAjt is
a dummy indicator denoting whether the specific contract is signed by a WA, Cjt is a
vector of contract related characteristics (i.e. specific clauses and duration), Fjt a vector
of firm-specific attributes (size of workforce, ownership, industry and regional affilia-
tion) and financial variables (after-tax net profit margin), Mt is a vector of macroeco-
nomic correlates (national and local unemployment, expected inflation and reduction in
the NMW imposed by the government) and ejt is the error term. Given that the
extensive margin of nominal adjustments refers to a categorical dependent variable
capturing three alternative outcomes (Bdownward^ or Bupward^ adjustments and
Bwage stickiness^) a multinomial logit model is utilized to recover the corresponding
parameter estimates shown in equation (1). In the case of the intensive margin, typical
regression techniques (OLS) are utilized.
Nevertheless, the estimated impact of WA on both measures of base-wage adjust-
ments is subject to the problem of sample selection, since our dataset contains only
firms that have signed a firm-level contract. That is, we are missing the group of firms
that compose the counterfactual and thus, we are unable to estimate the impact of
several firm-specific variables on firm’s intension to sign a firm-level contract. How-
ever, restricting our analysis to the post-reform period (P = 1) we are able to investigate
whether firm-level contracts in the post-reform period signed by a WA (instead of a
12 Since the available data do not allow us to construct a valid counterfactual, our results should not be
interpreted as causal ones. Ideally, this counterfactual would have contained firms that do not negotiate at the
firm-level in the pre- and post-reform periods.
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TU) are associated with different bargaining outcomes regarding contractual base
wages. Thus, equation (1) is reduced to the following specification:
y jt ¼ β0 þ β2WAjt þ β3C jt þ β4F jt þ β5Mt þ e jt ð2Þ
In order to get estimates of the parameters included in equation (2) we utilize (a) in the
case of the extensive margin, a binary logit model since in the post-reform period we do
not observe contracts with base wages increases and (b) in the case of the intensive
margin, a Tobit model given the mass of zeros in contractual base-wage changes.
In an attempt to estimate the differentiated effect of the utilized independent variables
we will also estimate a conditional on WA model specification of the following form:
y jt ¼ a0 þ β3C jt þ β4F jt þ β5Mt þ e jt
 
WA ð3Þ
This will enable us to derive estimates of the effects of the independent variables for a
sub-sample of contracts signed by the new form of workers’ representation (WA = 1) and
by a typical trade union (WA = 0). This exercise is expected to shed light on whether
firms with different structural characteristics (i.e. firm-size) have a different base-wage
adjustment profile. One related hypothesis is that for the bargaining pair in which a WA
is involved the downward base-wage adjustment is negatively related to firm size.
Another hypothesis to be tested concerns the negative correlation between current
unemployment rates and the process of downward adjustment given that the bargaining
power of WA is weak (e.g. compared to a TU, a WA has a rather loose structure).
Three alternative model specifications of equation (1) will be estimated for the entire
period (2010–2013). The first pertains to the unconditional estimate of the post-reform
effect on nominal wage adjustments. The second specification decomposes the effect of
WA on downward adjustment from the adjustment in the post-reform period and the
third relates to the full model specification outlined in equation (1). Given that the
reference period in equation (2) is exclusively the post-reform period, we will estimate
two model specifications. The first pertains to the unconditional estimate of WA on
nominal base-wage adjustments and the second, to the full model specification (equa-
tion 2). Lastly, several specifications of equation (3) will be estimated. In this context,
wewill compare the estimated parameters of the set of independent variables for the sub-
samples of WA and TU. Furthermore, we will check the robustness of the estimated
parameters from the TU sub-sample by adding bargaining related outcomes of TU. We
note that these outcomes are of no particular importance in the case of WA (Table 2).
Estimation Results
Table 3 (Panel A) presents the estimated marginal effects for the extensive margin and
OLS estimates for the intensive one. With regard to the extensive margin, we observe
that firm-level contracts signed during the post-reform period exert a higher probability
of Bdownward^ adjustment compared to contracts signed during the pre-reform period
(70.9 percentage points). In the case of Bwage stickiness^, the estimated effect of the
post-reform period is practically zero (0.3 percentage points) and, as expected, the
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Table 3 The extensive and intensive margins of nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in the pre- and
post-reform periods (Law 4024/2011) and in negotiations with different type of workers’ representation
(marginal effects)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Downward Wage stickiness Upward Wage change
Panel A
Post-reform .709 (.018)*** .003 (.033) –.712 (.031)*** –.120 (.005)***
Log-pseudo-likelihood –974.90 –
R-squared – .222
Panel B
Post-reform .629 (.042)*** .074* (.042) –.703 (.065)*** –.074 (.005)***
WA .503 (.031)*** –.466*** (.032) –.037 (.019)** –.094 (.008)***
Log-pseudo-likelihood –826.22 –
R-squared – .351
Panel C
Post-reform –.033 (.172) .070 (.143) –.037 (.053) –.007 (.021)
WA .328 (.073)*** –.278 (.066)*** –.049 (.035) –.074 (.012)***
Clause: Industrial peace .117 (.051)** –.120 (.048)** .003 (.015) –.032 (.016)**
Clause: Union dues –.481 (.128)*** .511 (.126)*** –.030 (.012)** .064 (.012)***
Clause: Time-off union duties –.335 (.159)** .275 (.132)** .060 (.044) .026 (.007)***
Clause: Productivity bonuses –.169 (.102)* .182 (.097)* –.013 (.012) –.001 (.013)
Duration: 1–4 quarters –.242 (.045)*** .227 (.042)*** .016 (.014) .032 (.009)***
Duration: 5–8 quarters –.100 (.062) .093 (.059) .007 (.019) .011 (.011)
Firm size: 5–19 employees .074 (.077) –.094 (.067) .019 (.020) –.019 (.010)
Firm size: 20–49 employees .038 (.078) –.054 (.067) .016 (.027) .001 (.011)
Firm size: 50–149 employees .001 (.076) –.038 (.062) .038 (.036) –.013 (.010)
Ownership: Private firm –.132 (.066)** .117 (.058)** .015 (.017) .032 (.012)**
Profit margin: 0–25 percentile .129 (.053)*** –.101 (.051)** –.027 (.009)*** –.012 (.011)
Profit margin: 25–75 percentile .172 (.050)*** –.145 (.045)*** –.027 (.012)** –.006 (.011)
Profit margin: missing .134 (.055)** –.101 (.050)** –.032 (.016)** .001 (.011)
National unemployment .119 (.033)*** –.104 (.030)*** –.015 (.006)** –.011 (.003)***
Local unemployment .006 (.005) –.005 (.004) –.001 (.001) –.002 (.001)*
Expected inflation (Eurozone) –.274 (.386) .190 (.356) .084 (.068) .072 (.041)*
Reduction in NMW .119 (.075) –.087 (.070) –.031 (.028) –.043 (.010)***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-pseudo-likelihood –659.99 –
R-squared – .460
Number of contacts 1537 931
Number of firms 1203 655
Source: Greek Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare (authors’ calculations)
Notes: The results from the extensive margin refer to the estimated marginal effects of the multinomial logit
model while in the case of the intensive margin they correspond to the OLS estimated coefficients. Robust
standard errors in parentheses with clustering at the firm-level
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level
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marginal effect for the Bupward^ adjustment category is negative and equal to 71.2
percentage points. These finding imply that firm-level contracts in the pre-reform
period were associated with upward adjustment in nominal base wages while in the
post-reform period they are associated with downward adjustment.
Panel B presents the estimation results when a WA indicator is included as an
additional correlate. We observe that firm-level contracts signed during the post-reform
period exhibit a higher probability of downward adjustment (compared to contracts
signed in the pre-reform period, 62.9 percentage points) while those signed by WA are
more likely to be associated with downward base-wage adjustment (compared to con-
tracts signed by TU, 50.3 percentage points). In contrast, in the Bwage stickiness^ case we
observe that contracts in the post-reform period have 7.4 percentage points higher
probability of zero changes in base wages compared to firm-level contracts signed in
the pre-reform period. Furthermore, contracts signed by WA are 46.6 percentage points
less likely (compared to TU) to stipulate zero changes in contractual wages.
When additional correlates (i.e., firm-specific attributes and macroeconomic variables)
are taken into consideration the estimated results (PanelC) showthat the estimatedeffects of
the post-reform period and the WA indicators are now smaller with the former becoming
practicallyzero.Thus, firm-levelcontractssignedbyWAhave32.8percentagepointshigher
probabilityofdownwardadjustmentcomparedtothosesignedbyaTU.Wealsoobservethat
the probability of downward adjustment is lower in contracts where the workers’ represen-
tation is well structured, the duration of contracts is short, the firm is privately owned,
recording higher profit margins and operating in times of low unemployment.
Regarding the intensive margin, the unconditional OLS estimate (Panel A) indicate
that the magnitude of the downward adjustment in the post-reform period corresponds
to an estimated reduction of -12.0 %. This negative effect is reduced to -7.4 when the
indicator of WA is taken into consideration (Panel B). In this case we also found that
contracts signed by a WA are associated with an average base-wage reduction of 9.4 %.
Moving to the augmented version of our empirical model (Panel C) we observe that the
estimated effects are further reduced and in fact the estimated effect of the post-reform
dummy indicator becomes statistically insignificant. With regard to the effect of the
WA dummy variable we observe that firm-level contracts signed by WA are associated
with a reduction of 7.4 % in base wages. Thus, we conclude that the downward
nominal base-wage adjustment (extensive and intensive margins) observed in the
post-reform period is a composition effect consisting of a time-period effect (post-
reform period) and a structural effect (involvement of a WA in collective bargaining).
Table 4 presents estimation results of equation (2) referring to firm-level contracts
signed in the post-reform period. As shown in Panel A, firm-level contracts signed byWA
have 46.8 percentage points higher probability of downward base-wage adjustment
compared to those signed by TU. However, this effect is reduced (23.1 percentage points)
when additional correlates are taken into consideration (Panel B). We note that the effects
of the remaining independent variables are similar to those of Table 3. With regard to the
intensive margin, again, we observe that WA are associated with base-wage reductions.13
13 The WA dummy is likely to be endogenous, given that this form of worker representation may depend on
the need of specific firms for substantial base wage adjustments or on other firm-specific attributes, e.g. on
firm size. We have also attempted to elaborate the endogenous character of the existence of a WA using firm
size as instrument. However, the obtained 2SLS results have led to qualitatively and qualitatively similar
results which are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5 presents estimation results for the extensive and intensive margins of base-
wage adjustments for the post-reform period and for WA and TU, separately. In the case
of extensive margin in contracts signed by WA (column 1) we observe that the
probability of downward adjustment is higher in contracts with prolonged duration,
smaller firm sizes and in periods of high unemployment. Regarding the sub-sample of
contracts signed by TU (column 2) we observe that the probability of downward
adjustment is higher in contracts with prolonged duration, in non-privately owned
Table 4 Workers’ Association and the extensive and intensive margins of nominal contractual base-wage
adjustments in the post-reform period (marginal effects)
Extensive margin (Downward) Intensive margin (Wage change)
Panel A
WA .468 (.033)*** –.091 (.008)***
Log-pseudo-likelihood –548.99 –74.71
Panel B
WA .231 (.069)*** –.045 (.012)***
Clause: Industrial peace .072 (.029)** –.023 (.015)
Clause: Union dues –.446 (.172)*** .107 (.037)***
Clause: Time-off union duties –.268 (.166) .077 (.030)**
Clause: Productivity bonuses –.140 (.090) .018 (.021)
Duration: 1–4 quarters –.186 (.037)*** .034 (.009)***
Duration: 5–8 quarters –.081 (.048)* .011 (.012)
Firm size: 5–19 employees .063 (.048) –.036 (.013)**
Firm size: 20–49 employees .032 (.048) –.010 (.014)
Firm size: 50–149 employees .026 (.044) –.027 (.013)**
Ownership: Private firm –.064 (.040) –.039 (.014)***
Profit margin: 0–25 percentile .085 (.029)*** –.024 (.015)
Profit margin: 25–75 percentile .105 (.030)*** –.017 (.013)
Profit margin: missing .077 (.034)** .003 (.014)
Monthly unemployment .083 (.027)*** –.016 (.009)
Local unemployment .002 (.003) –.001 (.001)
Expected inflation (Eurozone) –.168 (.246) .129 (.079)
Reduction in NMW .042 (.057) –.034 (.014)**
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Linear time trend Yes Yes
Log-pseudo-likelihood –435.22 24.17
Number of contacts 1263 665
Number of firms 1068 522
Source: Greek Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare (authors’ calculations)
Notes: The results from the extensive margin refer to the estimated marginal effects of the binary logit model
and fro the intensive margin to the estimated marginal effects of a Tobit model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses with clustering at the firm-level
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level
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firms and in firms with low profit margin. These results remain unaltered when charac-
teristics for the bargaining structure of TU are taken into consideration. However, these
additional variables are found to exert statistically significant effects on the extensive
margin. These results point to the presence of substantial differences in the factors that
shape the downward base-wage adjustment between WA and TU. While firm size and
current unemployment do play a role in the case of WA they do not seem to matter when
the workers’ side is represented by TU. In contrast, while bargaining structure character-
istics and profitability indicators seem to be related with the extensive margin in the case
of TU, they do not seem to matter when the workers’ side is represented by WA. Similar
patterns are also observed in the case of the intensive margin.
We note that our results regarding the optional peace clause indicate that employees
engage inconcessionbargainingbynotundertakingcoerciveactions (e.g., strikes, lockouts,
boycotts) andwhile they accept basewage reductions they Bbuy^ some sort of employment
security due to the outside threat of unemployment. Of course a stronger view in favour of
this argument requires data on the firing rate of firms with and without peace clause which
howeverarenotavailableandthusfurther researchonthis topic iswarranted. Inaddition,our
results reveal that the downward base wage adjustment process is more severe (in both the
extensive and the intensivemargins) inworkplaceswithout provisionsonclauses regarding
tradeunionduesandtime-offfor tradeunionduties.Thismayindicate that infirmswhichare
characterized by cooperative (with unions) workplace relations and recognize the long-
established role of trade unions, the downward base wage adjustment is less abrupt than in
firms which do not follow such types of integrative collective bargaining practices.
Conclusions
The decentralization of the collective bargaining process is viewed as a key instrument
for linking wages to individual productivity, firm-specific conditions and the prevailing
conditions in the labor market. This study presents stylized facts regarding base-wage
adjustments and attempts a first assessment of the effects of a specific aspect of the
2011 industrial relations reform in Greece. We have developed a unique dataset relying
on data extracted from the universe of the publicly available collective agreements at all
levels of collective bargaining (broader and firm-level agreements), covering a consid-
erable period before and after the reform (January 2010-December 2013). Extracted
information from the firm-level agreements were matched to firm-specific variables
(firm size, ownership, industry affiliation, net profit margin) and were also linked to
several semi-aggregate (industry affiliation, local unemployment) and aggregate vari-
ables (national unemployment, inflation and changes in NMW).
A considerable expansion of firm-level bargaining was observed in the examined
period, especially in the first quarter after Law 4024/2011 became effective. In this
context, we show that employee coverage by firm-level contracting is on the increase
especially for firms with more than 50 employees. According to our results (a) in the
post reform period, all contractual agreements were associated with base-wage reduc-
tions, (b) firm-level contracting in the reformed collective bargaining framework
facilitated downward adjustment in nominal base wages, (c) contracts signed at the
firm-level led to greater wage reductions than those signed at broader levels of
bargaining, (d) the observed wage adjustments (extensive and intensive margins) are
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more likely to occur in firms in which workers are represented via the new form of
representation in collective negotiations at the firm level, workers’ association and (e)
substantial differences are observed in the factors that shape the downward base-wage
adjustment processes between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in
collective bargaining (i.e., firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and
aggregate unemployment). We should point out that, at the aggregate level, the adjust-
ments in nominal base wages, agreed upon in decentralized collective bargaining, are still
shaped by traditional forms of workers’ representation (i.e., trade unions) since workers’
associations concern a rather small share of the total workforce in non-government jobs.
Several caveats are in order. The first relates to the lack of firm-level data for those
firms deciding not to engage in firm-level collective bargaining. This limitation does not
allow us to compare the adjustments of wage outcomes for Btreated^ and Buntreated^
firms in the pre- and post-reform periods. Thus, our findings although descriptive provide
an indication for the impact of the new form of workers’ representation (due to the
reform). Of course, they cannot be considered as causal since the possibly different
characteristics of treated and untreated firms may have imposed biases on the results. The
second pertains to the lack of data on individual-level contracts which according to
anecdotal evidence are on the increase. This limitation implies that our findings regarding
downward wage rigidities cannot be generalized for the Greek economy as a whole.
Third, given the short period under examination, firm-level contracts cannot be followed
over time. Therefore, the estimated results could be attributed to compositional effects,
given that the reform has allowed workers in smaller firms to participate in decentralized
negotiations. Also, the estimates of the effects of WA on the intensive margin of base-
wage adjustments may be influenced by reporting biases with regard to the exact amount
of base-wage changes. In addition, the generalization of the results should be avoided as
they only cover a recessionary period and one should be cautious in seeking symmetric
upward adjustments during a period of economic expansion.
Further research should focus on identifying the impact of the reform on real wages
using matched employer-employee longitudinal survey data. In this context, the anal-
ysis on whether the reform was a successful tool to alleviate the extensive gap between
labor costs and firm-specific productivity seems to be a natural extension of the present
study. Also, the developed herein dataset could be used to determine the impact of the
reform on other non-wage aspects of collective bargaining in Greece (e.g., contract
duration, working hours, performance-related pay). Lastly, the substitutability or com-
plementarity of the base wage and the flexible part of the total wage bill needs to be
addressed as more appropriate data become available.
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